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INTEGRITY AND REFLECTION
Suzanna Sherry*
Professor Waldron and Professor Michelman have presented us
with two interesting, but very different, views on what procedural
components might contribute to the integrity of lawmaking. I will
focus on a different aspect of legislative integrity: legislation
reflection. "Reflection" has two meanings, and in this context they
are direct opposites. A legislature can be reflective as a mirror is
reflective: It can be a reflection of its constituents and therefore a
relatively direct agent of popular sovereignty. But reflective can also
mean thoughtful and deliberative; a legislature that is reflective in this
sense "reflects" or deliberates to reach its own views of appropriate
legislation (although constituent views, of course, can be one factor in
the deliberations).
The bivalent meanings of reflection lurk beneath the surface of the
papers by Professors Waldron and Michelman. Professor Waldron,
for example, describes a truly deliberative legislature, and suggests
that it can provide a model for the United States Congress. Professor
Michelman is less certain that deliberation can ever produce
consensus, or that legislative integrity can ensure legitimacy.
Although neither directly discusses the question, it seems that both
scholars would agree with me that only a deliberative legislature, and
not a mirror-like one, affords sufficient protection of rights within an
otherwise purely majoritarian regime. Where they differ, perhaps, is
in their assessment of the capability of legislatures-or at least the
Congress-to behave in a deliberative fashion.
Almost certainly, a deliberative legislature is what the founders of
our constitutional regime envisioned. Many aspects of both the
original Constitution and eighteenth century American society served
to re-enforce the likelihood that legislators would consider both
individual liberty and majority desires, and not be led astray by what
James Madison called the "transient impressions"' of the populace, or
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1. James Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which
Framed the Constitution of the United States of America 167 (Gaillard Hunt &
James Brown Scott eds., The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1999) (1920) (reporting for
June 26, 1787).
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what Elbridge Gerry called "the excess of democracy. '2 The founders
did not want Congress to emulate what Gouverneur Morris called the
"precipitation, changeableness, and excesses"3 of state legislatures.
Instead, the Constitution they wrote tried to ensure that Congress
would deliberate in a thoughtful and civic-minded way about the good
of the nation.
Factors that limited direct democracy, and therefore encouraged
reflection, included the various "filtering" provisions of the
Constitution, such as the electoral college and the selection of
Senators by state legislators. There were also state laws limiting the
franchise in various ways, and, perhaps most important, barely
lingering societal norms of natural aristocracy, civic virtue, and
political deference.
As Gordon Wood has demonstrated, however, these social limits
were collapsing even as the Constitution was ratified.4 Societal trends
toward democratization proceeded apace, and were quickly followed
by both statutory and constitutional changes that broadened the
franchise and diminished the effect of the Constitution's mediating
provisions. The trend accelerated in the twentieth century, and by the
second half of the twentieth century virtually all of the constraints on
direct popular sovereignty were gone. Senators are now directly
elected, and the electoral college no longer exercises any
independence. The franchise has been broadened, not only by
eliminating status-based qualifications such as race and gender, but
also by removing qualifications that had previously served to ensure a
somewhat deliberative voting population: The abandonment of all
educational and property requirements, as well as poll taxes, means
that any 18-year-old citizen can now vote. Other changes include a
decrease in voter responsibility and a drop in the percentage of
eligible voters who actually vote, further reducing the incentive for
true deliberation. The expanded role of money and the media
cemented these trends, and many politicians now end up appealing to
the most reflexive rather than reflective instincts. Of course, many, if
not most, of these changes are for the better. Even taken altogether,
the changes are not necessarily a bad thing. But they do change the
nature of the legislature, making it more likely to be a mirror rather
than a deliberative body.
The evidence suggests just such a decline in legislative deliberation.
In the last quarter or so of the twentieth century, we have had a
federal legislature that either thinks of itself as purely reflective of
popular will (with a mandate from the American people) or is simply
incompetent at true deliberation. Much of the significant legislation
2. Id. at 32 (reporting for May 31, 1787).
3. Id. at 202 (reporting for July 2, 1787).
4. See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution
(Vintage Books 1993) (1991).
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that Congress has enacted recently has been duplicative of existing
state or federal legislation (or unnecessary for other reasons),
constitutionally suspect, or both. Even if useful in the abstract, it has
been so hastily and sloppily drafted as to cause problems in
application and unanticipated consequences. But all of this legislation
has been highly popular either with the general public or with
powerful constituents, and much of it has been passed by
overwhelming margins in election years or in times of perceived crisis.
Some of this legislation might have been a good idea, but it was
written and enacted with little real consideration. Had there been
more serious deliberation, some of the legislation might not have been
enacted at all, and some might have been enacted in different form.
I draw my examples from a broad variety of subject areas, but they
have much in common. All were passed by large majorities, quite
quickly, and often in an election year. A few have already been
invalidated by the Supreme Court. Examples of unnecessary statutes
include the Violence Against Women Act,5 the Gun-Free School
Zones Act,6 and the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act ("E-SIGN"),7 all of which duplicated laws already on
the books or in process in most states. The first two statutes, of
course, were invalidated by the Court for other reasons.8  The
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")9 duplicated
the still-new Federal Trademark Dilution Act,1" and courts were
successfully using the latter to remedy and prevent cybersquatting1
when Congress decided to jump in and pass the ACPA. The Defense
of Marriage Act" was unnecessary because courts had already
interpreted the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to
permit states to refuse to recognize out-of-state marriages that
violated their own public policies; no further legislation was necessary
to ensure that states would not have to recognize gay marriage. 3
Congress also ignored the Constitution in enacting popular statutes.
5. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
6. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (1990).
7. Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000).
8. United States v. Lopez held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act overstepped
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). In United
States v. Morrison, the Court held that Congress, in passing the Violence Against
Women Act, exceeded its powers under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 529 U.S. 598,627 (2000).
9. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999).
10. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
11. See Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in
Cyberspace, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 309, 320-32 (2002).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
13. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283(2) (1971) (stating that a
valid marriage "will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong
public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the
spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage").
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The Communications Decency Act 4 blatantly ignored existing First
Amendment doctrine in sweeping legislation that was quickly-and
unsurprisingly -invalidated by the Supreme Court. 5  The Flag
Protection Act 6 was similarly obviously unconstitutional, and was also
invalidated.17 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 8
which was recently upheld by the Court 9 (wrongly, in my opinion),
was enacted deliberately to get around constitutional limitations:
Legislators expressed the hope that successive extensions of existing
copyrights could effectively extend copyrights "forever" despite the
"limited times" language in the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution.20
Other statutes, while probably constitutional and arguably
necessary, were drafted so hastily that the unanticipated consequences
may well outweigh the benefits. The Supplemental Jurisdiction Act,21
a five-paragraph statute meant simply to return the law of pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction to what it was before a particular Supreme
Court case, is so poorly drafted that it has created at least three
different circuit splits.22 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 3 in addition to its
primary purpose of ensuring corporate responsibility, imposes
radically new obligations on lawyers, changing their relationships with
their clients and treading into territory previously regulated only by
the states. The problems are so numerous that the SEC was forced to
delay issuing regulations for that section of the statute. There is also
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,24
which changes the rules for estate taxes. It phases out federal estates
taxes gradually, so that there will be none at all in 2010. But-little
known except to tax lawyers-it also reinstates federal estate taxes the
very next year, 2011, back at 2001 rates! It is now impossible to
engage in rational estate planning unless you know whether you will
die before or after January 1, 2011. Some people are apparently
adopting living wills that give different instructions about whether
heroic measures should be taken depending on the date on which the
decision needs to be made.
In all of these instances, Congress took the easy way out. Many of
the statutes involved circumstances not readily susceptible to interest
14. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 501, 110 Stat. 133 (1996).
15. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
16. Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989).
17. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
18. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
19. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
20. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. H9951-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Mary Bono).
21. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
22. See Sherry, supra note 11, at 319 n.30.
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
24. Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
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group politics. Nobody is for violence against women, or guns in
schools, or even flag-burning. The strongest arguments against the
statutes are abstract and theoretical: the need to avoid duplication, or
the values of federalism and free speech. A deliberative Congress
would consider those abstract interests, despite the fact that few
members of the public were urging them to do so. This Congress did
not, or at least did not take the interests seriously.
My bottom line, then, is this: Only a legislature that is reflective in
the sense of being deliberative can act with integrity. A great deal of
evidence suggests that the contemporary American Congress is
incapable of being reflective, and I therefore conclude that it is not
likely to act with integrity. If we are looking for the branch of
government most likely to act with integrity and to uphold our
enduring values and aspirations, we should -unpopular as the
suggestion is today-heed Alexander Bickel's advice and turn to the
judiciary.
Notes & Observations
